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Large-scale strategic change projects in companies may be supported by using 
alliance networks. This paper shows that IBM’s change from an exploitation 
strategy towards an exploration strategy required a radically different network 
strategy as well. By entering into more non-equity alliances, involving new partners 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Strategic change is often seen as something internal to the firm. This paper proposes 
that external relations in a company’s alliance network can be used in strategic 
change processes as well. The IBM case is used to prove this point. The paper shows 
that exploration strategies, aimed at innovating and business development, and 
exploitation strategies, aimed at making the most of existing competences, require 
different network structures. Network behaviour aimed at exploitation is compared 
to network behaviour aimed at exploration in the case of IBM. The conclusion is that 
the networks for these two objectives differ substantially and that IBM has 
consciously used its network to support its strategic change project. 
 
 
STRATEGIC CHANGE: EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION 
 
Strategic change is often considered as a necessity for companies to survive in a 
turbulent environment (Hamel and Prahalad 1994). Intense international competition 
and rapid technological change are often mentioned as primary motives for 
companies to adapt their corporate strategy (Christensen 1998; Eisenhardt and 
Tarbizi 1995; Sadowski et al. 2003). One way of facilitating strategic change is to 
engage in alliances for the exploration of new capabilities and the exploitation of the 
existing knowledge base of the corporation (March 1991). Alliances are a means of 
learning from alliance partners (Kale et al. 2000; Khanna et al. 1998). The process of 
learning boils down to the exchange of technological knowledge or capabilities. 
Technological capabilities are the accumulated technical skills and know-how in an 
organization.  
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In order to come up with a more refined view on learning, we will make use of 
March’s (1991) seminal distinction between exploitative and explorative learning. 
Exploitation is generally associated with the refinement and extension of existing 
technologies. Exploration on the other hand deals with experimentation with new 
alternatives and the exploration of a new (technological) field. In this paper we 
argue that there are important differences between both types of learning (March, 
1991; Chesbrough, 2003), which significantly affect the way in which companies 
make use of their external technology networks. 
 
 
EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION: THE IMPACT ON NETWORKS 
 
As suggested above, exploration and exploitation strategies are not just internal to 
the firm. Alliance networks are often used to support these strategies. In spite of the 
vast body of literature on strategic technology alliances, only very few papers focus 
particularly on the use of networks for exploitative or explorative learning (for 
exceptions see e.g. Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002; 
Rowley et al., 2000). There is consensus in these few contributions that firms 
pursuing a strategy of exploration for product development are most likely to 
establish alliances that are characterized by ‘weak ties’ (Granovetter 1973). ‘Weak 
ties’ in this context mean that companies exhibit low commitment to their alliances 
and team-up with non-familiar partners. When exploring a particular new 
technology, companies may not want to enter into inflexible forms of alliances, 
because they do not know whether the technology will prove to be useful to them. 
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They want to have the opportunity to abandon the alliance at any given moment 
(Duysters and De Man, 2003). Strong ties, characterized by intimate, recurrent and 
trustful relationships, on the other hand are helpful with an exploitation strategy 
(Krackhardt 1992). In order to exploit knowledge and make the most of established 
technologies and products intensive relation with partners are a prerequisite. 
Exploitation requires intensive knowledge exchange and creating economies of 
scale. Both can be achieved in strong ties and much less so in weak ties, because 
only strong ties have the requisite intensity for this. Hence, exploration strategies 
lead to lower-commitment R&D alliances in new technological capabilities, since 
the focus is on learning new ideas from new partners. Exploitation strategies on the 
other hand will lead to high-commitment alliances in existing technological 
capabilities (Koza and Lewin 1998). In the literature we find some scattered 
empirical evidence on this matter. Hansen et al. (2001), Afuah (2000) and Rowley et 
al. (2000) found strong evidence that the value of strong and weak ties depends on 
the type of learning and the external environment. Rowley et al. (2000) showed that 
strong ties are particularly effective for exploitation purposes and less for effective 
for exploration. The need for weak ties has been shown to be particularly high under 
conditions of rapid technological change where the need for explorative learning is 
highest (Afuah, 2000). 
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Table 1: Network characteristics for exploration and exploitation strategies 
 Exploration Exploitation 
Alliance type 
 
 
Speed of changes of 
partners 
 
Type of partner 
capabilities 
Non-equity alliances; few 
equity alliances 
 
Higher: many new 
partners enter the network 
 
Partners with the similar 
technologies 
Relatively high number of 
equity alliances 
 
Lower: few new partners 
enter the network 
 
Partners inside current 
business 
 
 
Empirically, exploration networks differ from exploitation networks in three 
observable ways (see Table 1).  First, exploration networks will make use of flexible 
legal structures, whereas exploitation alliances will use legal structures that enable 
long-term collaboration. Exploration networks therefore have a preference for non-
equity alliances, whereas exploitation networks will have a larger proportion of 
equity alliances in them (Koza and Lewin 1998). Joint development agreements 
(JDA) and joint research pacts (JRP) are non-equity agreements with lower levels of 
commitment. Agreements with a high level of commitment are equity-based 
relations like joint ventures (JV). A measure for the extent to which a network shifts 
towards an exploration strategy is obtained by counting these alliance types across 
different time periods. 
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Second, in exploration networks partner turnover will be higher than in exploitation 
alliances. Companies pursuing exploration strategies will change their partners more 
often. Comparing the composition of a network in period t with the network 
composition in t+1, will show that the proportion of new partners in an exploration 
network is higher than the proportion of new partners in an exploitation network. 
Exploration requires access to a diversity of knowledge and a continuous scanning 
of new technological opportunities. As these opportunities often arise outside 
existing partners, partner turnover will be high. Exploitation requires intense 
collaboration. This takes time to build up and benefits will accrue only after long-
term collaboration. Consequently, exploitation networks will have a higher 
proportion of the same partners over time than exploration networks. 
 
A third measurable characteristic of networks that differs between exploitation and 
exploration strategies relates to partner capabilities. In exploration networks 
companies will look for partners with capabilities outside their existing business. In 
exploitation networks companies will tend to look for companies with similar 
technological knowledge. Exploration strategies lead to an innovation network 
consisting of partners in new technological areas. Exploitation strategies on the other 
hand will lead to an innovation network of partners in similar technological areas. 
 
To find out whether companies actually use and adapt their network when entering a 
period of strategic change, these network measures will next be studied for the IBM 
case. In the 1990s IBM went through a major reorganization, changing from an 
exploitation strategy towards an exploration strategy.  This makes IBM 
exceptionally well suited to observe whether the IBM network changed accordingly, 
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using the network measures as stated in Table 1. This will be investigated below 
using the MERIT-CATI database of strategic technology alliances, as discussed in 
more detail in Hagedoorn and Schakenraad (1992), and the CGCP database of 
strategic technology alliances.3 
 
 
BRIEF HISTORY OF IBM 
 
The history of IBM starts with the history of a few other companies with 
competencies in different mechanical fields. Computing Tabulating Machines (CTR) 
was formed in 1911 via a merger of International Time Recording Company, 
Computing Scale Company and the Tabulating Machines Company.4 In 1914, 
Thomas J. Watson Sr. joined the company to become general manager and CTR was 
renamed International Business Machines (IBM) in 1924. IBM’s business machines 
consisted of a large variety of commercial products, everything from scales and 
cheese slicers to clocks and typewriters (Gerstner 2002). Watson’s patriarchal 
leadership and personal philosophies defined IBM’s culture. Nonetheless, it was his 
son Tom Watson Jr., succeeding his father as CEO in 1956, who led IBM into the 
digital computer age. This was a major turnaround for the company (Gerstner 2002).  
 
                                                 
 
3 The CGCP database is used as a complementary database for the period 2001-2002, for which the 
data were not available in the MERIT-CATI database. The data collection method of the CGCP 
database is similar to the MERIT-CATI database. For a description of the CGCP database, see 
http://www.cgcpmaps.com. 
4 Source: “A century of innovation”, a Flash presentation of IBM’s history, downloaded from 
http://www.ibm.com in June 2002. 
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Under the leadership of Watson Jr., in 1964 IBM announced its most important 
product to date, System/360, which was the original name of IBM’s “family” of 
mainframe computers.5 System/360 in the 1960s and 1970s was as revolutionary as 
Windows was to Microsoft in the 1980s and 1990s. The comparison between these 
two companies is appropriate since both IBM and Microsoft benefited from major 
technological shifts and brought entirely new capabilities for customers to the 
market (Gerstner 2002: 114). For IBM the integrated circuit was the most important 
technology shift, though the circuit had been invented elsewhere. This invention 
made computers significantly smaller, more reliable and cheaper, making mainframe 
computers available for a large group of customers. Up to that moment, computers 
were based on proprietary technologies, but since System/360 was a family of 
computers – from very small to very large processors – customers could easily make 
upgrades when needed and software developed for one processor would run on any 
System/360 processor. In addition, peripheral equipment could run on any processor 
of the family. In short, System/360 was the ideal system for customers. On IBM’s 
competitors, however, the introduction had a devastating effect (Gerstner 2002).  
 
Until the early 1980s, IBM was probably the best example of a vertically integrated 
corporation: almost all stages of design, production and commercialization of 
computers remained internal to the firm (Ernst 2003). This was true for 
semiconductors, hardware, operating systems, application software, and sales and 
distribution. IBM was the world leader in computer manufacturing and it seemed 
that the company’s leadership position would remain unchallenged for many years 
                                                 
 
5 Ibidem. 
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to come. IBM was one of the pioneers in mainframe computers and still is one of the 
world’s largest providers of computer hardware. The company manufactures a broad 
range of computers, including personal computers, notebooks, mainframe computers 
and network servers.  
 
Since the position of IBM had been unchallenged for so many years, the company 
had not developed sophisticated strategies to cope with fierce competition. In the 
advent of the “next big thing”, which was the rise of UNIX rather than personal 
computing, IBM was under serious attack. UNIX was an “open” operating system, 
supported by Sun and Hewlett-Packard, which offered customers the first attractive 
alternative to IBM’s mainframe computers (Gerstner 2002). In addition, IBM failed 
to see that personal computers (PCs) would be widely used by business and 
enterprises, so the PC market was not a high priority to IBM. PCs were not thought 
of as a major challenge to IBM core enterprise computing market. IBM gave control 
over the operating system to Microsoft and the microprocessor to Intel and in the 
early nineties IBM’s leadership position started to crumble. Fujitsu, Digital 
Equipment and Compaq were the competitors for hardware components and were 
catching up fast. EDS and Andersen Consulting were gaining ground in information 
services, while Intel and Microsoft were more profitable in the PC market than IBM 
at that time (Hamel 2000). The once so comfortable position of “Big Blue” was 
fading away at a very rapid pace. In April 1993, Louis Gerstner was appointed as 
CEO and he had the difficult task to transform IBM in such a way that it could 
regain its competitive position. 
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STRATEGY CHANGE OF IBM: ENTERING THE INTERNET ERA 
 
Two forces that emerged in the computer industry in the early 1990s were decisive 
for IBM’s strategic change (Gerstner 2002: 125). The first force, system integration, 
emanated from customers. Customers increasingly valued companies that could 
provide solutions integrating technology into the processes of enterprises. Because 
of this customer-driven force, IBM saw that in time the ICT industry would be 
service-led rather than a technology-led. The second force was the emergence of the 
networked model of computing that would replace the stand-alone PCs that 
dominated the market in the beginning of the 1990s. The PC would be one of the 
networking devices, but the management of free-flowing digital information would 
be done on large-scale systems rather than desktop computers. Thus, computing 
infrastructure and software would have the future. It was only logical that IBM had 
to turn its attention toward services and software, and in addition the company 
decided to sell and license leading-edge technology to its competitors, which helped 
Big Blue back in the saddle (Gerstner 2002: 149). 
 
Hamel (2000) provides an illustration of the strategic change that helped IBM 
transform from a hardware manufacturer into a dominant service provider. The 
major change that took place in the mid-nineties was brought about by a few 
visionary individuals at IBM who discovered the Internet as a potential source of 
future revenues. This small group of believers developed an Internet strategy for the 
corporation as a whole.  
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An important initiative to help IBM catch the Internet wave was undertaken by 
David Grossman, a computer programmer who was one of the first to download the 
Mosaic browser and explore the Internet (Hamel 2000). To his surprise, IBM had 
zero presence on the Web while competitors such as Sun-Microsystems and 
Hewlett-Packard had already set-up websites and used them actively. IBM was the 
main sponsor of the Winter Olympics, but it was Sun that used IBM-generated up-
to-date scores and other data. These were presented on television and on their 
Winter Olympics website. Many people thought that Sun was the main sponsor 
instead of IBM. Grossman managed to convince John Patrick, an IBM strategist, and 
eventually IBM’s CEO Gerstner, that IBM needed to “get connected” (Hamel 2000).  
 
Grossman and Patrick formed an Internet group, which hired employees from 
divisions across IBM bundling all Web technology that people had been working on 
in the company. The first showcases came in 1994 with IBM’s Global Network, as 
the world’ s largest Internet Service provider, and a Web browser that preceded 
Netscape’s Navigator and Microsoft’s Explorer. For the 1996 Summer Olympics the 
Internet group developed a website with an extensive scoring database attached to it 
and the possibility for on-line sales of tickets. The Web server software developed 
for the Summer Olympics evolved into a product called Websphere, which formed 
the basis for IBM’s Web-hosting business of today (Hamel 2000). Palissano, 
Gerstner’s successor, took the e-business even further, using a different strategy. He 
successfully made IBM’s organization flatter and more flexible, which enabled the 
company to adapt more quickly and more adequately to a rapidly changing 
competitive environment. 
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In short, before Gerstner initiated IBM’s strategy change, IBM followed an 
exploitation strategy. This is evident from the fact that there was a strong focus on 
the internal development of hardware and software in existing expertise areas of 
mainframe computers and PowerPC’s. After Gerstner’s strategy change, IBM 
followed an exploration strategy. This is evident from the fact that IBM was willing 
to sell and share technology in exchange of know-how in new areas of software and 
service development. Whether this change went with a change in IBM’s network, 
will now be researched. 
 
 
DATA AND SAMPLE 
 
Whether IBM’s alliance network supported its move from an exploitation strategy 
towards an exploration strategy is researched by means of looking at the network 
composition in three pairs of years with three year intervals: 1991/1992, 1996/1997, 
2001/2002.  The predictions based on Table 1 are that over time, IBM starts to make 
relatively more use of non-equity alliances, increases the number of new partners in 
its network and looks for an increasing number of partners outside its 1991/1992 
core business. The method is based on event analysis, by singling out a period of 
strategic change and taking snapshots of the IBM network before, during and after 
that period. This method of repeated observation around an event aims to increase 
our understanding of network change, by combining qualitative with quantitative 
analysis. 
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These predictions are tested by using alliance data from the MERIT-CATI database 
and the CGCP database, which tracks alliance activity over the period covering our 
study. The databases register the partners, their industry and the type of alliances and 
thus contains all relevant information. The periods are chosen because they represent 
three time periods relevant for IBM’s strategic change. In 1991/1992 IBM had an 
exploitation strategy. In 2001/2002 the effects of the strategic change towards an 
exploration strategy should have materialized. The years 1996/1997 are years in 
which the first effects of the strategic change initiated by Gerstner should have 
become visible. Gerstner started in 1993 as CEO of IBM and he took some time to 
formulate the new strategy. Next, it takes about one or two years before an alliance 
is set up, negotiated and announced, so that 1996 will be the first year in which the 
strategic change could be discernible in IBM’s alliance network. Pairs of years are 
used, rather than individual years, in order to obtain a reasonable amount of alliances 
for our study. 
 
Alliance agreements can take a variety of forms, with a wide range in the level of 
commitment. Alliance agreements include (cross-) licensing agreements, customer-
supplier contracts and standard-setting agreements. Since this is a study on 
innovation networks, the alliance that are of particular relevance are those that 
involve joint research and development or other forms of technology sharing (Koza 
and Lewin 1998). We therefore study joint development agreements (JDA), joint 
research pacts (JRP) and research joint ventures (JV). 
 
IBM is historically by far the most active in alliance formation among its peer group. 
The company has had more alliances than any other company in the ICT domain: 
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384 alliances with 227 different partners in the period of 1985 to 2002. These 
numbers are higher by far than any other company in the sample, which makes IBM 
an interesting case for further investigation.  
 
 
THE IBM NETWORK: 1991-2002 
 
In this section, we will investigate how networking strategies facilitated the business 
transformation of IBM initiated by Gerstner. In order to do this, the networking 
strategies of the early nineties, before Gerstner’s arrival in 1993, are compared with 
the networking strategies in the mid-nineties and the beginning of the 21st century.  
 
Most activities that characterized IBM in the late eighties and early nineties have 
been gradually farmed out to multiple layers of specialized suppliers, giving rise to 
rapid market segmentation and an ever-finer specialization. This has given rise to the 
co-existence of complex, globally organized product- specific value chains (e.g., for 
microprocessors, memories, board assembly, PCs, networking equipment, operating 
systems, applications software, and sales & distribution). An important initial 
catalyst of vertical specialization was the availability of standard components, which 
allowed for a change in computer design away from the centralized IBM mainframe 
to decentralized architectures, PC and PC-related networks (see e.g. Langlois, 1992). 
 
In order to see the significance of the overall corporate strategy change at IBM, the 
network embeddedness of IBM in the period before Gerstner’s appointment is 
compared with the period after that. In the period 1991-1992 IBM engaged in 55 
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alliances, 42 of which were joint development agreements and joint research pacts, 
nine were joint ventures and research consortia and two cross-licensing agreements 
(see Figure 1). From those 55 strategic alliances, 23 were in the field of computer 
manufacturing, mainly in the development of microprocessors, and 23 in the field of 
software development, mostly related to operating systems and software 
architecture. IBM had two important alliances with Microsoft and Intel. Microsoft 
and IBM cross-licensed Windows New Technology and with Intel, IBM had a long-
term agreement on the development of microprocessors. This latter agreement had a 
time horizon of 11 years, but was terminated in 1993. The two agreements confirm 
IBM’s choice for the so-called Wintel personal computers.6 IBM is also active in 
developing software for third parties. Examples of these types of software 
development agreements are alliances with airline-companies such as a flight 
reservation system for American Airlines (AMAIRL) in 1992. IBM is also very 
active in developing communication networks, such as local area networks. The 
company, to a lesser extent, is involved in industrial automation, such as CAD/CAM 
applications. 
 
                                                 
 
6 Wintel is a contraction of Windows and Intel. IBM had set the standard for the PC, Microsoft for 
the operating system and Intel for the microprocessor.  
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Figure 1: IBM’s innovation network (1991-1992) 
 
Source: MERIT-CATI database 
 
IBM intensively collaborates with personal computer and software developer Apple 
on many fields of alliances within the ICT domain. The collaboration with Apple 
seems strange, since IBM and Apple support different and competing basic designs 
of computing (Hagedoorn et al. 2001). However, in the period 1991-1992 IBM and 
Apple had ten strategic alliances, mainly related to the development of 
microprocessors and software architecture. The technology developed in these 
alliances is mainly related to microprocessors for PowerPCs and mainframe 
computers, and the development of software, including network software, operating 
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systems and multimedia applications. Though non-equity R&D agreements may 
indicate exploration of new capabilities (Koza and Lewin 1998), it is clear that IBM 
and Apple were highly committed (Gulati 1999; Nooteboom 1999; Uzzi 1996, 1997; 
Walker et al. 1997). The long-term relationship between these two companies 
indicates a strong tie (Krackhardt 1992) for exploiting technological capabilities in 
RISC architecture and software. Strategic alliances between IBM and Apple are not 
reported in the period 1997-2000. 
 
In the period 1996-1997, IBM had 32 strategic alliances, 27 of which were joint 
development agreements; two were joint ventures, two cross-licensing agreements 
and standardization agreement. What stands out immediately when comparing this 
period (Figure 2) with the previous one (Figure 1) is the collaboration with multiple 
partners and the increased complexity of the network configuration. In the period 
1991-1992 most agreements were bilateral, but in the period 1996-1997 there are 
some large consortia involving many different partners. The multiple partnerships 
with Toshiba and Motorola are all in developing microchips, one of IBM’s core 
competencies, indicating that IBM is exploiting existing capabilities (March 1991; 
Walker et al. 1997). 
 
However, more and more of the partnerships in the period 1996-1997 are joint 
development agreements in relatively new areas of expertise, which indicates that 
exploration of new technological capabilities is becoming more important to IBM  
(Khanna et al. 1998; Koza and Lewin 1998; March 1991). This is especially true for 
joint R&D in the fields of telecommunication (developing switches) and browser 
software. Along with these relatively new fields, existing technological capabilities 
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in microelectronics and computing were used for developing microchips and 
improving PowerPC technology. 
 
Figure 2: IBM’s innovation network (1996-1997) 
 
Source: MERIT-CATI database (1996); CGCP database (1997) 
 
From 1996 onwards it becomes clear that the pioneering work of the Internet group 
at IBM (Hamel 2000), which has been discussed above, has been mutually 
reinforced by corporate networking strategies. Before 1996, IBM had no alliance 
agreement related to the development of Internet-related products or services. In 
1996-1997 only 6 out of 32 alliance agreements deal with Internet, one of which is a 
joint venture with Netscape, Oracle, Sony, Nintendo, Sega Enterprise and NEC. This 
joint venture was set up for the development of Internet browsing software. From 
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1996 onwards, Internet-related products and services are becoming more and more 
important. IBM has gradually employed networking strategies in a variety of 
Internet-related products and services, based on the products developed by the 
Internet group such as Internet browsers, ThinkPad, WebSphere and other e-
business applications. IBM’s core competencies are still in computer hardware and 
software, but the focus of attention is shifting to Internet and e-business solutions, a 
field unknown to the company before 1996. Developing these new capabilities 
clearly indicates an exploration strategy (Khanna et al. 1998; Koza and Lewin 1998; 
March 1991). So, in a relatively short period of time IBM managed to change from a 
laggard to a leader in global (Internet) service provision. This has been achieved first 
through internal organizational transformation and second through a new portfolio 
of networking strategies. 
 
When comparing the network of alliances of 1996-1997 and 2001-2002, it appears 
that alliances in computer manufacturing have become less important. In 1996, 
hardware manufacturers as Motorola and Sun Microsystems were prominent 
partners of IBM (Figure 2), whereas there are no alliances with these companies in 
2001-2002 (Figure 3). On the other hand, alliances on software and 
telecommunications have become more important. Alliances with Microsoft, 
Peoplesoft, and Citrix Systems in 2001-2002 (Figure 3), for instance, show that IBM 
explored a wide variety of software development projects. In the field of 
telecommunications, IBM has been developing new products with network 
developers Cisco and Nortel Networks, and leading mobile phone manufactures 
such as Ericsson, Nokia and NTT DoCoMo in 2001-2002. These collaborations 
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make IBM a strong partner in telecommunications in North America, Europe and 
Asia. 
 
Figure 3: IBM’s innovation network (2001-2002) 
Source: CGCP database 
 
The data presented in Figures 1-3 show that IBM engages mainly in alliances in the 
fields of computer manufacturing and software development, the company’s 
traditional core competencies, which may lead to the conclusion that IBM has 
mainly exploited existing capabilities. Frequent partnerships in computer and 
software development demonstrate that IBM’s high level of commitment (Gulati 
1999; Krackhardt 1992; Nooteboom 1999; Uzzi 1996, 1997; Walker et al. 1997), in 
that the company maintains relationships with a select group of partners in a wide 
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variety of projects over a longer period of time. However, especially in the period 
1996-1997 and 2001-2002, IBM establishes more relationships outside its existing 
technological capabilities. Thus, gradually exploration of new capabilities becomes 
more important (Khanna et al. 1998; Koza and Lewin 1998; March 1991). 
 
Looking specifically at alliance type, speed of change of partners and the type of 
capabilities sourced via alliances, Tables 2-4 show numerically what changes in the 
IBM network took place. First, a change in networking strategies can be seen in a 
change in the proportion of non-equity versus equity agreements. The first category 
of agreements is joint development agreements (JDA) and joint research pacts 
(JRP). These non-equity agreements on joint research and development indicate 
exploration strategies, as discussed in Koza and Lewin (1998). Equity agreements, 
such as joint ventures (JV) are usually associated with exploitation (Koza and Lewin 
1998). Though the pattern of alliances is rather volatile, both in terms of the number 
of agreements and in terms of the type of alliance agreements, it becomes clear from 
Table 2 that equity agreements have become less important in IBM’s networking 
strategies over the last decade. A relatively large proportion of high commitment 
agreements (JV) and an abundance of license agreements related to microelectronics 
and computing characterized the period till 1992. After 1992, the proportion of high 
commitment agreements is decreasing, while the proportion of lower commitment 
R&D agreements (JDA/JRP) is increasing. In the base period 1985-1990 and 1991-
1992, equity agreements had a share of respectively 12 % and 18 % of all alliance 
agreements. However, in the period 1996-1997 and 2001-2002 these share decreased 
to respectively 6 % and 5 %. Following Koza and Lewin (1998), this trend indicates 
that exploration is becoming more important than exploitation after 1991-1992. IBM 
 
 
21
has adapted its network to reflect the new strategy of exploration by means of 
entering into more flexible alliances. 
 
Table 2: Non-equity versus equity agreements 
 1985-1990 1991-1992 1996-1997 2001-2002 
Non-equity agreements 99 (88 %) 45 (82 %) 30 (94 %) 57 (95 %) 
Equity agreements 14 (12 %) 10 (18 %) 2 (6 %) 3 (5 %) 
Source: MERIT-CATI database (1985-1996); CGCP database (1997-2000) 
 
Comparing the types of alliance partners in the three innovation networks with each 
other and with the period 1985-1990, it can be demonstrated that the alliance 
activities are dominated by a search for new partnerships (Granovetter 1973). Table 
3 shows that the share of new partners in the innovation network compared to each 
of the previous periods is relatively high. In the period 1991-1992, 63 % of the 
partners were new to IBM, while in the period 1996-1997, the share of new partners 
is 68 %. Even more remarkable is the high share of new partners of 78 % in 2001-
2002. This means that in the innovation network, IBM only collaborated before with 
13 out of 59 partners. Moreover, the partners come from a different technological 
field than IBM’s origin. Only few of the frequent partners in hardware 
manufacturing can be found in Figure 3. Instead, these partners work on client-based 
software and services. This trend indicates that IBM is becoming more of a service-
led company, which again reflects Gerstner’s strategy of business transformation 
towards exploration. 
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Table 3: New partners in IBM’s innovation network 
 1985-1990 1991-1992 1996-1997 2001-2002 
Number of partners 116 44 44 59 
New partners n.a. 28 30 46 
Proportion of new partners n.a. 63 % 68 % 78 % 
Source: MERIT-CATI database (1985-1996); CGCP database (1997-2002) 
 
To get better grips on the technological capabilities that are searched for, all 
alliances that IBM engaged in are subdivided into six categories: computers, 
software, Internet, telecommunications, microelectronics and other ICT related 
activities (Table 4).7 The focus of attention in strategic technology alliances over the 
years is rather volatile, but alliances on computer and microelectronics 
manufacturing, and the development of standard and dedicated software are most 
common in the period 1985-1992. In the period 1985-1990, half of the agreements 
were on computer manufacturing and one-quarter on software development. In the 
period 1991-1992, computer manufacturing and software development have equal 
shares of 42 % and naturally there were no alliances on Internet applications (see 
Table 3). However, strategic networking in the development Internet applications, 
both hardware and software, has become more important. In 1996-1997, 19 % of all 
alliance agreements deal with Internet applications. But especially in 2001-2002, the 
proportion of alliance on Internet applications is remarkable with a share of 55 %. In 
the light of March’s (1991) definition, this indicates that IBM’s exploring strategies 
are more dominant in 2001-2002 than its exploitation strategies.  
                                                 
 
7 These are categories that are common in the MERIT-CATI and CGCP database. A detailed 
description of all categories can be found in Duysters and Hagedoorn (1993). 
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Table 4: Search for capabilities in innovation networks 
 1985-1990 1991-1992 1996-1997 2001-2002 
Computers 57 (50 %) 23 (42 %) 19 (59 %) 8 (13 %) 
Software 28 (25 %) 23 (42 %) 1 (3 %) 10 (17 %) 
Internet 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 6 (19 %) 33 (55 %) 
Telecommunications 14 (12 %) 4 (7 %) 5 (16  %) 5 (8 %) 
Microelectronics 6 (5 %) 2 (4 %) 1 (3 %) 1 (2 %) 
Other 9 (8 %) 3 (5 %) 0 (0 %) 3 (5 %) 
Source: MERIT-CATI database (1985-1996); CGCP database (1997-2002) 
 
 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The strategic change project IBM initiated in the 1990s is clearly visible in the 
changing alliance network. The network reflects a considerable shift in the way IBM 
shaped its learning strategy with network partners.  
 
The study into IBM’s network has a number of implications for management 
practitioners and researchers. The first implication is that company alliance networks 
can be used to facilitate strategic change inside a company. Strategic renewal is not 
just an internal project. It can be stimulated by an active use of the company 
network. Different strategies require different types of networks. Learning strategies 
aiming at exploitation require different alliances and alliance partners than learning 
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strategies aimed at exploitation. To be successful, new company innovation 
strategies need to be translated into new networks (De Man, 2004). 
 
Second, this strategic change in the network can be brought about by three 
mechanisms: shifting the balance between equity and non-equity relationships, 
increasing the speed of change of partners and looking for partners in areas outside 
the existing competences. IBM has used all three of these techniques to support its 
new strategic direction. Even though some authors have claimed that networks 
stimulate innovation (e.g. Chesbrough, 2003; Porter, 1990), the techniques that 
companies employ for this have rarely been identified. The IBM case not only 
shows these techniques, it also shows they are employed simultaneously to obtain 
the full effect. Merely changing partners is not sufficient; the type of relationship 
with them should change as well, as should the type of partner. From a practitioner’s 
perspective, but also from an academic point of view, these findings are very 
important because, apart from a few notable exceptions (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; 
Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002; Rowley et al., 2000) the dominant stream of 
literature on alliances tends to ignore a more in-depth view on various types of 
learning and the employment of different alliance strategies to accommodate these 
types of learning. 
 
Third, this study suggests IBM has been able to consciously manage the shift in its 
network. The alliance literature has paid little attention to change and network 
dynamics. It seems most of the literature implicitly assumes networks are static 
entities beyond the influence of individual companies. The IBM case supports the 
opinion that companies have a choice in shaping their networks and are able to 
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affect network composition. Of course a powerful player like IBM may have more 
latitude in directing its network than smaller companies, but clearly a deterministic 
view on networks is not supported by this case. Rather, networks are shaped by the 
conscious actions of companies. These findings definitely strengthen the call for a 
more dynamic approach to network research (Oliver, 2001), as compared to the 
static approaches that are commonly used today. 
 
A fourth conclusion pertains to the method used. By using the method of comparing 
snapshots of networks over time in relation to a specific event, it was possible to 
reveal and understand main trends in the IBM network. This method is an extension 
of the method of repeated observation in case studies (Yin, 1989). In this case the 
time period for making observations is not chosen randomly. It is connected to a 
specific event. The combination of a qualitative and quantitative analysis provides a 
more solid ground for drawing conclusions than a purely qualitative description 
would have done. Simultaneously it provides more understanding than a purely 
statistical network analysis could have achieved, because it stays closer to real-life 
characteristics of alliances (equity vs. non-equity, type of industry of partners, new 
partner or not). In the case of IBM the method of repeated observations around an 
event works well: it delivers good insights about relevant changes in IBM’s network 
related to the event of its change of innovation strategy. The disadvantage of the 
method is that it may be vulnerable to the choice of event and time-windows. Table 
4 for example shows volatility in the number of software and computer related 
alliances. This may be caused by the choice of year. A more continuous picture 
might have shown another trend for the alliances in these industries. Another limit is 
that the focus has been on only one event. Even though this appears to be the most 
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important event for IBM over the period studied, other events occurring during the 
period 1991-2001 may have had an impact on IBM’s network as well. The method 
used does not allow us to evaluate the influence of those events. Hence, the method 
is probably best applicable to research looking at the long-term developments of 
networks around large scale changes which require a number of years to elapse 
before their full effect shows. More fine-grained case studies are required to obtain 
detail about the impact of lesser events. 
 
A question raised by this case relates to the effect on the network partners of 
strategic change in a company. The alliance literature stresses the importance of 
(personal) relationships, trust and reputation in alliances and networks (Gulati, 1995; 
Jones et al., 1997). If these elements are relevant then restructuring a network should 
be a painful and difficult affair. IBM however seems to have adapted its network 
fairly quickly. Does this mean that these relational aspects are less important than is 
often thought? Or do these relational aspects apply mainly in a situation of 
exploitation and if so, what relational aspects are relevant for exploration networks? 
Or have the costs to changing the network indeed been very high for IBM and its 
partners? The previous study has not given answers to these questions. Surveying or 
interviewing partners may help to shed light on this issue. This is especially relevant 
because little is known about the relative importance of social ties versus business 
logic in networks. Both have been recognized as relevant influences, but to what 
extent they strengthen or contradict each other is unclear. 
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